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Abstract
Attribute based encryption is suitable for data protection in data outsourcing systems such as cloud computing. However, the
leveraging of encryption technique may retrain some routine operations over the encrypted data, particularly in the field of data
retrieval. This paper presents an attribute based date retrieval with proxy re-encryption (ABDR-PRE) to provide both fine-grained
access control and retrieval over the ciphertexts. The proposed scheme achieves fine-grained data access management by
adopting KP-ABE mechanism, a delegator can generate the re-encryption key and search indexes for the ciphertexts to be shared
over the target delegatee’s attributes. Throughout the process of data sharing, the data are transferred as ciphers thus the server and
unauthorized users cannot acquire the sensitive information of the encrypted data so the privacy and confidentiality can be
protected. By security analysis, the proposed scheme meets the security requirements confidentiality, keyword semantic security
as well as collusion attack resistance.
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1 Introduction
The developments of several new computing techniques such as
distributed computing [1] have made data sharing more and
more convenient among users. However, while users are
enjoying the convenience brought by these techniques, they
are also faced with a series of issues related to information
security. These issues arise from the fact that most computing
resources providers are operated by commercial institutes which
are very likely to be outside of the trusted domain of data
owners. Although traditional Bone-to-one^ data encryption
techniques can preserve the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive data [2], they are not able satisfy a series of new de-
mands emerging in these scenarios, such as high efficient data
encryption, fine-grained access control, etc. To be a new type of
public key cryptosystem, attribute based cryptosystem provides
a good method to tackle the above problems. In attribute based
cryptosystem, a data owner does not have to know the exact
identity of each receiver, he can realize fine-grained data access
control by describing the ciphertexts or target users using attri-
butes. Consequently, attribute based cryptosystem is especially
suitable for data protection in distribute network scenarios.
So far, researches domestic and abroad have proposed
many schemes on attribute based cryptosystems, including
attribute based encryption schemes, attribute based signature
schemes, attribute based signcryption schemes and attribute
based proxy schemes, etc. These schemes are equipped with
rich functionalities and favorable security properties.
However, traditional encryption techniques may retrain
some routine operations over the encrypted data, particularly
in the field of data retrieval [3, 4]. Since data are stored as
ciphers in the data outsourcing center and the quantity is very
large [5–9], it is inconvenient for a data receiver to seek out the
target files and contents hidden in the ciphers. One method is
that a data receiver decrypts all the possible ciphertexts and
search the desired file over the plaintexts, but the decrypt oper-
ation over the possible ciphers will add considerable computa-
tion. Thus, a scheme which provides both the function of proxy
re-encryption and data retrieval is urgently to be proposed.
In this paper, we present an attribute based date retrieval
with proxy re-encryption (ABDR-PRE) to provide both fine-
grained access control and retrieval over the ciphertexts. Our
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scheme achieves fine-grained data access management by
adopting KP-ABE mechanism, a delegator can generate the
re-encryption key and search indexes for the ciphertexts to be
shared over the target delegatee’s attributes. Our scheme also
introduces key updating mechanism by cutting the system
lifespan into several time periods and the re-encryption keys
are time-bounded. A re-encryption key from a previous time
slice cannot generate a valid ciphertext for the current time
period so that the authority of the server can be securely insu-
lated. Throughout the process of data sharing, the data are
transferred as ciphers thus the server and unauthorized users
cannot acquire the sensitive information of the encrypted data
so the privacy and confidentiality can be protected. By secu-
rity analysis, our scheme meets the security requirements con-
fidentiality, keyword semantic security as well as collusion
attack resistance.
2 Related works
2.1 Attribute based encryption
In 2005, Sahai et al. proposed the first ABE scheme which
adopted threshold as the access structure [10]. Later, Goyal
and Bethencourt et al. designed new access structures named
KP-ABE [11] and CP-ABE [12] respectively, which can pro-
vide more flexible managements over the encrypted data.
Based on their constructions, researchers have proposed many
valuable schemes. Waters et al. in [13] presented a new novel
CP-ABE scheme which applied LSSS to satisfy the demands
of access control management and proved their scheme to be
secure under d-BDHE assumptions. Li et al. in [14] proposed
a paralyzed CP-ABE and applied their scheme in cloud envi-
ronments. Equipped with AES algorithm, the processes of key
generation and encryption became more efficient. Reedy et al.
in [15] designed a secure architecture for digital health system
by taking the advantage of CP-ABE. Their scheme allowed a
public auditor to conduct verification of the health data with-
out leaking users’ personal information. Furthermore, their
scheme solved the issue of key escrow by introducing two
key generations. Liu et al. in [16] proposed a functional CP-
ABE which not only supported attribute revocation but also
realized black box piracy tracing when key exposure occurred.
Meanwhile, there is no need for system manager to define the
global attribute set in advance, so the proposed scheme is
equipped with high scalability and extensibility. Yang et al.
in [17] pointed out that the considerable cost of decryption and
revocation were two obstacles which could prevent the further
application of CP-ABE. They also designed a CP-ABE
scheme for cloud access which adopted several centers to
manage users’ attributes. The efficiency of attribute revoca-
tion and decryption had been improved in this mode. Padhya
et al. in [18] extended the functions of CP-ABE by hiding the
access policies. Besides, it was resisted to collusion attack
conducted by malicious users. Miyaji et al. in [19] presented
a novel dual-policy ABE by combing the merits of both CP-
ABE and KP-ABE. Their scheme was equipped with constant
length of ciphertext and testified to be secure under q-BDHE
assumption. Cheng et al. in [20] designed a secure and revo-
cable CP-ABE scheme. The core idea of their scheme was to
separate the original files into several data segments before
encryption. When attribute revocation occurred, data owner
only needs to re-encrypt the ciphertexts which accorded with
the attributes to be altered. This technique avoided the consid-
erable computation burden of re-encrypting all the ciphertexts
and was proved to be more efficient by conducting experi-
ments on hardware. Qiu et al. in [21] realized the function of
hidden policy which protected the confidentiality of both ci-
phertexts and access structures. By conducting simulation, the
authors claimed the overall effectiveness of their scheme was
raised. Hong et al. in [22] applied ABE to mobile multimedia
networks and gained time-bounded security by leveraging a
flexible key refreshing mechanism. Apart from the above re-
search directions, researchers have also presented schemes
with various functions such as ABE constructed on lattice,
ABE without pairings [23], etc.
2.2 Proxy re-encryption
A proxy re-encryption protocol consists of three entities: del-
egator, proxy server and delegatee. Delegator has the privilege
of decrypting the original ciphertext. What’s more, delegator
can generate a proxy key using his private key and the target
delegatee’s public key. With the proxy key and the original
ciphertext, a semi-trusted server can generate a new ciphertext
which is encrypted by the delegatee’s public key. Throughout
the re-encryption process the data are transferred as ciphers so
the confidentiality and privacy during data communication
can be guaranteed.
Until now, researchers have presented many re-encryption
schemes with multiple functions [24]. These schemes can be
divided into directional and unidirectional according to the re-
encryption directions. From the prospective of cryptosystem,
these schemes can be classified as identity based proxy re-
encryption, attribute based proxy re-encryption, etc.
2.3 Searchable encryption
Searchable encryption is an efficient technique to provide key-
word search function over the encrypted data. The framework
of a searchable encryption usually involves three entities: data
owner, user and server. Data owner generates the ciphertext
along with the search indexes of the corresponding ciphertext,
then sends them to be stored in the server. User generates the
trapdoor for the required ciphertext using the private key he
owns and delivers the trapdoor to the server. Server returns the
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corresponding ciphertext to user if the trapdoor matches with
the given search index. Due to its properties, searchable en-
cryption is particularly suitable for information retrieval in
data outsourcing systems such as cloud computing. From the
prospective of cryptosystems, existing works referring to
searchable encryption can be divided into symmetric crypto-
system searchable encryption, traditional public cryptosystem
searchable encryption, identity based searchable encryption,
etc.
3 Models and definitions
For the convenience of description, we denote some notations
which are listed in Table 1.
3.1 Syntax
Our proposed ABDR-PRE consists of ten algorithms:
Setup(1φ→MK, PK) It takes a security parameter as
input and outputs PK, MK.
Key generation(MK, γi→
SK)
It takes MK and an user’s γi as
input, it outputs SK of the user.
Key update This algorithm is an interaction
between AA and user. It refreshes
user’s SK from previous time slice
to the newest version.
Encrypt(M, Ai, PK→
CT)
It takesM and the target Ai as input
and outputs CT.
Re −Key generation(SK,
Aj, PK→ rk)
It takes the delegator’s SK and the
delegatee’s Aj as input, it outputs
rk.
Search index
generation(w, Aj, PK→
IN)
It takes w related to a ciphertext
and the delegatee’s Aj as input and
outputs IN.
Re − Encrypt(CT, rk→
CT′)
It takes rk and CT as input and
outputs CT′.
Trapdoor(SK,w, PK→
TR)
It takes delegatee’s SK and w as
input and outputs TR.
Test(TR, IN, PK→CT′) It takes TR, IN as input and returns
CT′ if TR is valid.
Decrypt(CT′, SK→M) It takes CT′ and the delegatee’s SK
as input and outputs M.
3.2 Security properties
Confidentiality: This security property can be proved by a
game described as follows.
Setup: Adversary claims a challenging attribute set Sc.
Challenger runs setup algorithm and sends public parameters
to Adversary.
Key generation query: On input the access structure picked
by Adversary, Challenger outputs the corresponding private
key and sends it back to Adversary.
Re −Key generation query: On input an access structure
and an target attribute set, Challenger returns rk to dversary .
Re − Encrypt query: Adversary delivers rk and CT to
Challenger and obtains CT′.
Challenge: Adversary generates M0, M1 of equal sizes.
Challenger picks σ ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts Mσ over Sc and returns
CTσ to Adversary.
Adversary outputs σ′ as the guess of σ and wins the game if
σ′ = σ.
The advantage of Adversary can be defined by Adv ¼
Pr σ
0 ¼ σ  − 12 j.
Keyword semantic security: This security property can be
proved by a game described as follows.
Setup :Challenger runs Setup to obtain the public parame-
ters in the game
Adversary claims γic to be the challenging structure.
Trapdoor query: Challenger can obtain the trapdoor of
several keywords for attribute set S by running Trapdoor al-
gorithm and sends the results back to Adversary.
Challenge : Adversary picks keywords w0, w1 which are
not from previous queries.
Challenger picks σ ∈ {0, 1} and runs Search index
generation algorithm to get the IN of wσ.
Adversary outputs σ∗ as a guess of σ. If σ∗ = σ then
Adversary wins the game.
The advantage of Adversary can be defined by Adv Að Þ
¼ Pr σ* ¼ σ½ j − 12 j.
Table 1 Notations
Abbreviation Meaning
φ Security parameter
AA Attribute authority
MK System master key
PK System public parameters
f Hash functions
Ai Single attribute Bi^
t Time slice
S Attribute set
γi Access structure containing Ai
sk User’s private key
rk Re-encryption key
w Keyword
IN Search index
TR Trapdoor
CT Original ciphertext
CT′ Proxy ciphertext
M Plaintext
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Collusion resistance: This security property requires that it
is computational infeasible for a sever and a malicious dele-
gatee to collude in order to calculate the private key of a
delegator.
4 Constructions
Setup: AA defines two p order groupsG1,G2. Let e^ : G1  G1
→G2 be a bilinear pairing and g1, g2 are two generators ofG1.
Defines a global attribute set. Defines hash functions: f1 : {0,
1}∗→G1, f 2 : 0; 1f g*→Z*p. Randomly chooses h; y∈Z*p and
computes Y ¼ e^ g1; g2ð Þy;H ¼ g2h: Picks ai for each attri-
bute in the system and let Ai ¼ g1ai ;Ai
0 ¼ g2ai ;AHi
0 ¼ g2hai .
MK = { y , l , a i } a n d PK ¼ p;G1;G2; g1; g2; e^; f 1;f
f 2;H ;AHi
0
; Y ;Ai;Ai
0 g.
Key generation:For a user holding γi, AA picks r; ri∈Z*p
and defines a polynomial for each node in γi. The method of
polynomial generation is similar to Water’s scheme in [11].
Then the ini t ia l SK of a use can be def ined by
SK ¼ Di ¼ g1
qx 0ð Þ
ai ∙ f 1 Ai; t0ð Þh; i∈γi
n o
.
Key update: AA computes Ui ¼ f 1 Ai;tmþ1ð Þf 1 Ai;tmð Þ
 h
; i∈γi
 
when system enters tm from tm + 1. User updates SK by calcu-
lating Di ∙Ui.
Encrypt: For M with the target {Ai}, data owner selects s∈
Z*p then computes:
C0 ¼ M ∙Y s;C1;i ¼ Ai 0 s
C2;i ¼ f 1 Ai; tmð Þs;C3 ¼ g1s
C4;i ¼ AHi 0 s
ð1Þ
Then data owner sends the CT = {C0,C1, i,C2, i} to server.
Re −Key generation:When a delegator holding γi intends
to share CT over {Aj}, then the delegator picks k; x1∈Z*p;X∈
G2 and generates rk as follows:
rk1;i ¼ Di f 2 Xð Þ∙g1k
rk2;i ¼ Ai 0 k
rk3;i ¼ f 1 Ai; tmð Þ f 2 Xð Þ
C1
0 ¼ Aj 0 x1 ; f 1 Aj; tm
	 
x1 ;X ∙Yx1n o
rk ¼ rk1;i; rk2;i; rk3;i;C1 0
n o
ð2Þ
Search index generation:For w, the delegator picks x2∈Z*p
and generates IN of w as follows:
IN0 ¼ Yx2 f 2 wð Þ; IN1 ¼ g1x2
IN2; j ¼ Ai 0 x2 ; IN3; j ¼ f 1 Aj; tm
	 
x2 ð3Þ
The delegator sends IN = {IN0, IN1, IN2, IN3, j} to server.
Re − Encrypt:Upon receiving rk from delegator, server cal-
culates:
C2
0 ¼ ∏
i∈γi
e^ rk1;i;C1;i
	 

∙e^ C3; rk2;i
	 
−1
CT
0
¼ C0;C1 0 ;C2 0
n o
ð4Þ
Trapdoor: When a delegatee holding γj wants to make a
search on the ciphertext containingw, the delegatee picks l∈Z*p
and generates TR as follows:
TR1; j ¼ Dj∙g1l
	 
 f 2 wð Þ
TR2; j ¼ Ai 0 l f 2 wð Þ
TR3 ¼ HAi 0 f 2 wð Þ
ð5Þ
Then the delegatee sends TR = {TR1, TR2, j, TR3, j, TR4,
j ∈ γj} to the server.
Test:The server verifies whether (6) holds or not:
∏ j∈γ j e^ IN2; j; TR1; j
	 

∙e^ IN3; j; TR3; j
	 
−1∙e^ IN1; TR2; j	 
 ¼ IN0
ð6Þ
If equation (6) holds then the trapdoor is valid and the
server sends the CT′ to the delegatee.
Decrypt: After receiving the CT′, the delegatee calculates X
by computing:
X ∙Yx1 ∙ ∏ j∈γ j e^ A j
0 x1
;Dj
 
∙e^ AH j
0
; f 1 Aj; tm
	 
x1 −1 ð7Þ
Then recovers M by computing:
M ¼ C0
C2
0 f 2 Xð Þð Þ−1
ð8Þ
5 Discussion
5.1 Correctness proof
Firstly, CT is a valid original ciphertext and an authorized user
can recover the plaintext by calculating:
M ¼ C0∙ ∏ i∈γi e^ Di;C1;i
	 
−1∙e^ C2;i;AHi 0 −1 ð9Þ
The calculation involves the invoking of recursion and
Lagrange interpolation function which have already been fully
examined in [11], so in this paper the detailed calculation
process will not be repeated.
Then we will prove the correctness of proxy-encryption
and data retrieval.
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It can be figured out from (8) that C2
′ and X are two essen-
tial elements for recovering M.
From our constructions, C2
0 ¼ Y f 2 Xð Þs and the proof is
demonstrated in (10).
C2
0 ¼ ∏
i∈γi
e^ rk1;i;C1;i
	 

∙e^ C3; rk2;i
	 
−1∙e^ rk3;i;C4;i	 
−1
¼ ∏
i∈γi
e^ Di f 2 Xð Þ∙g1
k ;Ai
0 s
 
∙e^ g1
s;Ai
0 k
 −1
∙e^ f 1 Ai; tmð Þ f 2 Xð Þ; g2shai
 −1
¼ ∏
i∈γi
e^ g1
qx 0ð Þ f 2 Xð Þ
ai ∙ f 1 Ai; tmð Þh f 2 Xð Þ∙g1k ;Ai
0 s
 
∙e^ g1
s;Ai
0 k
 −1
∙e^
f 1 Ai; tmð Þ f 2 Xð Þ; g2shai
 −1
¼ ∏
i∈γi
e^ g1
qx 0ð Þ f 2 Xð Þ
ai ∙ f 1 Ai; tmð Þh f 2 Xð Þ;Ai
0 s
 
∙e^
f 1 Ai; tmð Þ f 2 Xð Þ; g2shai
 −1
¼ ∏
i∈γi
e^ g1
qx 0ð Þ f 2 Xð Þ
ai ; g2
ais
 
¼ ∏
i∈γi
e^ g1; g2ð Þqx 0ð Þ f 2 Xð Þs ¼ e^ g1; g2ð Þy f 2 Xð Þs ¼ Y f 2 Xð Þs
ð10Þ
The value of X can also be calculated via (7) and the proof
is demonstrated in (11):
X ∙Yx1 ∙ ∏
j∈γ j
e^ A j
0 x1
;Dj
 
∙e^ AH j
0
; f 1 Aj; tm
	 
x1 −1
¼ X ∙Yx1 ∙ ∏
j∈γ j
e^ g2
a jx1 ; g1
qx 0ð Þ
a j ∙ f 1 Aj; tm
	 
h ∙e^ g2a jh; f 1 Aj; tm	 
x1	 
−1
¼ X ∙Y x1 ∙ ∏
j∈γ j
e^ g2
a jx1 ; g1
qx 0ð Þ
a j
 −1
¼ X ∙Yx1 ∙ ∏
j∈γ j
e^ g2; g1ð Þ−qx 0ð Þx1
¼ X ∙Yx1 ∙Y −x1 ¼ X
ð11Þ
Equipped with C2
′ and X, a delegatee can recovers M by
calculating (8) since:
C0
C2
0 f 2 Xð Þð Þ−1
¼ M ∙Y
s
Y f 2 Xð Þs f 2 Xð Þð Þ
−1 ¼ M ð12Þ
The proof of Test is demonstrated in (13):
∏
j∈γ j
e^ IN2; j; TR1; j
	 

∙e^ IN 3; j; TR3; j
	 
−1∙e^ IN 1; TR2; j	 
−1
¼ ∏
j∈γ j
e^ g2
a jx2 ; g1
qx 0ð Þ
a j ∙ f 1 Aj; tm
	 
h∙g1l
  f 2 wð Þ !
∙e^
f 1 Aj; tm
	 
x2 ; g2ha j f 2 wð Þ −1∙e^ g1x2 ; g2a j f 2 wð Þl −1
¼ ∏
j∈γ j
e^ g2
a jx2 ; g1
qx 0ð Þ
a j
f 2 wð Þ
 
¼ ∏
j∈γ j
e^ g2; g1ð Þ f 2 wð Þqx 0ð Þx2
¼ e^ g2; g1ð Þ f 2 wð Þyx2 ¼ IN0
ð13Þ
5.2 Confidentiality and keyword semantic security:
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme is confidential in the se-
lective model if DBDH assumption holds.
& Proof: If an Adversary can break the confidentiality in our
scheme with non-negligible advantage ε, then a simulator
can be constructed to solve the DBDH problem with ε2 .
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme is keyword semantic se-
cure in the selective model if DBDH assump-
tion holds.
& Proof: If an Adversary can break the keyword semantic
security in our scheme with non-negligible advantage ε,
then a simulator can be constructed to solve the DBDH
problem with ε2 .
The methods we adopt to conduct the proof of theorem 1
and theorem 2 had been covered in detail in our previous work
[22], and not repeated in this paper.
5.3 Collusion resistance
Since there exist some malicious delegatees and the server
is considered to be semi-trusted, effective measures
should be taken to prevent collusion attack which may
happen during the process of data sharing. In this paper
we satisfy this significant security demand by introducing
two generators in the cyclic group as well as other secret
parameters in the re-encryption keys and search indexes.
In particularly, if a malicious delegatee colludes with sev-
er and merge their private information together, they can
obtain the rk, IN, TR and SK of the delegatee and their
purpose is to computes SK of the delegator. Note that
among these parameters only rk({rk1, i, rk2, i, rk3, i, C1
′})
contains the secrets of delegator’s private key. From the
process of decryption we can figure out that even
equipped with rk and SK of the delegatee, still SK of
delegator cannot be calculated since the value of g1
k re-
mains unknown, thus our scheme meets the security de-
mand of collusion attack.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes an ABDR-PRE scheme which allows a
delegator generates search indexes and re-encryption keys
over the target ciphertexts to be re-encrypted. It meets the
security requirements of confidentiality, keyword semantic
security and resistance of collusion attack. The high security
level and multiple functions makes it an applicable scheme to
provide efficient data sharing and retrieval in data outsourcing
scenarios.
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